Finally, verification of the whole project would require something close to full-scope safeguards by IAEA inspectors over nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan.
Indeed, in early June, when U. The report identified Khan as the director of the project to build the gas centrifuge plant, but his actual role was broader: head of the enrichment program. Commenting on State Department telegram which had been sent a few days earlier without his approval, Smith took issue with its approach toward Pakistan.
What was driving policy was concern about Afghanistan, that cross border raids from Pakistan by Afghan refugees were angering Moscow and its Afghan clients. Smith was uncomfortable with the approach outlined by Raphel. This message consists of a set of talking points for use by Ambassador Hummel in a presentation of the freeze to General Zia. While some of the specifics of the proposal are excised, there can be no question that the focus was a freeze on work at the experimental test bed of eight gas centrifuges at Chaklala, the pilot plant at Sihala, and the large-scale plant in the works at Kahuta.
General Zia and his advisers rejected the proposal; while Zia acknowledged the existence of an enrichment program he insisted that Pakistan required both reprocessing and enrichment for its nuclear energy needs.
He said he would study the proposal further, but Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz later officially turned it down. This memorandum from Secretary Vance to President Carter had as its premise several developments. One was a statement by Foreign Affairs Advisor Shahi that Pakistan might test a nuclear device in a matter of months.
Moreover, Peter Constable, the deputy chief of mission at the U. Embassy in Islamabad, had suggested a way to break the stalemate with Pakistan. In a message to Washington, subsequently forwarded to the embassy in New Delhi, Constable argued that U. While that would leave the gas centrifuge program intact, it could prevent a nuclear breakout in South Asia, which would constitute a major setback for the nonproliferation system.
His advisers informed him that Gerard C. A meeting with Jean Leygonie brought out French intelligence information on the role of Calorstat in supporting the Pakistani gas centrifuge program. After Leygonie made a point about the sophistication and speed of Pakistani centrifuges, he reported that Calorstat had provided the bellows that were to be used to connect the rotor tubes of gas centrifuges.
After alerting the customs and export control bureaucracy, on 2 May France stopped Calorstat from making any sales to Pakistan. By then, however, Calorstat had already shipped 1, of a total order of 10, bellows, as well as the design specifications and plan for bellows-making machinery.
According to Leygonie, the bellows and the centrifuge tubes were made from maraging steel, a specialized high-strength type of steel, which Calorstat had imported from the Netherlands. Before providing a detailed briefing of the Calorstat affairs, the French disclosed that the Pakistanis were acquiring both safeguarded and unsafeguarded uranium from Niger, which was being shipped through Libya.
The briefing on Calorstat disclosed that the Pakistani embassy in Bonn had made the purchase orders and provided manufacturing designs to the company. After Calorstat got the design right, it provided over one thousand of the 10, that the Pakistanis had ordered. Further discussion disclosed the French belief that the Pakistani gas centrifuge rotors were made from maraging steel. In the Pakistan case over 20 years earlier, yellow cake from Niger was not a spurious story.
This was not the last word, of course, on what had happened and the State Department would continue to seek more information from both the French and the Nigerians, in large part to make sure that such shipments did not happen again.
By the end of the year, investigations were continuing and the IAEA had become involved at the highest levels, in part to find out what had happened and to ensure the application of safeguards to all Nigerian uranium exports.
Moreover, the U. Zia was unwilling to make specific assurances. Allen Locke, on Gerard C. Locke further considered the idea of a nuclear free zone in the region. By , the Pakistani nuclear program was on the backburner as far as high-level U.
All the same, U. As a source of high-tech exports, West Germany was a continuing concern because a variety of its firms were involved in nuclear trade with Pakistan. In this message to the U. Like the message to Bonn, this non-paper demonstrated how far the Pakistanis had gone in acquiring technology from the Swiss that was vital to their fissile material production efforts. Whether they concern intelligence on A.
Khan remains to be learned. If the CIA followed up and monitored Khan, evidence has yet to surface. According to Khan, Eating Grass, at , the agreement to purchase the plant was reached in February Correct or not, Spiers shed light on U. Khan, Eating Grass , ; R. Khan, Eating Grass , and A article in The Washington Post defined a "non-paper" as a form of diplomatic "evasion" that enabled a government to pass along a position paper with no direct attribution—that is without "embassy fingerprints"—on it.
Khan, Eating Grass , , for more on Leybold-Hereaus. Skip to main content. Policy, Newly available records shed light on such important developments as: The earliest known U. The Documents. Document 1. State Department telegram to U. Delegation forwarding U. Jun 8, Document 2. Smith attached. Jan 20, Smith [Smith records], box 19, Pakistan Document 3. The cruise missile has a range of miles. Instead of GPS guidance, which could be disabled regionally by the U.
Babur-2 is deployed on both land and at sea on ships, where they would be more difficult to neutralize. A submarine-launched version, Babur-3, was tested in January and would be the most survivable of all Pakistani nuclear delivery systems.
Pakistan is clearly developing a robust nuclear capability that can not only deter but fight a nuclear war. It is also dealing with internal security issues that could threaten the integrity of its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan and India are clearly in the midst of a nuclear arms race that could, in relative terms, lead to absurdly high nuclear stockpiles reminiscent of the Cold War.
Home News Web Portal. Home GVS Newspaper. Why Pakistan has the most feared nuclear weapons program in the world. By News Desk. Previous article Muslims in west open their hearts to help poor, celebrate Ramazan in unique ways. News Desk - 13 January According to reports, more than employees work at Monal and they will lose their jobs when the restaurant shuts down for good. Israeli Army accidentally kills its officers in West Bank 13 January First time in Pakistan: Court orders closure of military golf course 13 January How will look like for Afghanistan?
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